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Abstract
In forensics it is a classical problem to determine, when a suspect S
shares a property Γ with a criminal C, the probability that S = C. In
this paper we give a detailed account of this problem in various degrees
of generality. We start with the classical case where the probability
of having Γ, as well as the a priori probability of being the criminal,
is the same for all individuals. We then generalize the solution to
deal with heterogeneous populations, biased search procedures for the
suspect, Γ-correlations, uncertainty about the subpopulation of the
criminal and the suspect, and uncertainty about the Γ-frequencies.
We also consider the effect of the way the search for S is conducted,
in particular when this is done by a database search. A returning
theme is that we show that conditioning is of importance when one
wants to quantify the “weight” of the evidence by a likelihood ratio.
Apart from these mathematical issues, we also discuss the practical
problems in applying these issues to the legal process. The posterior
probabilities of C = S are typically the same for all reasonable choices
of the hypotheses, but this is not the whole story. The legal process
might force one to dismiss certain hypotheses, for instance when the
relevant likelihood ratio depends on prior probabilities. We discuss
this and related issues as well. As such, the paper is relevant both
from a theoretical and from an applied point of view.
Keywords: Island problem, Forensic identification, Weight of evidence,
Posterior odds, Bayes’ rule.
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1 Introduction
In 1968, a couple stood to trial in a notorious case, known as “People of the
State of California vs. Collins”. The pair had been arrested since it matched
eye-witness descriptions. It was estimated by the prosecution that only one
in twelve million couples would match this description. The jury were invited
to consider the probability that the accused pair were innocent and returned
a verdict of guilty.
Later, the verdict was overthrown, essentially because of the flaws in the
statistical reasoning. The case sparked interest in the abstraction of this
problem, which became known as the island problem, following terminology
introduced by Eggleston [4]. Its formulation is the following. A crime has
been committed by an unknown member of a population of N+1 individuals.
It is known that the criminal has a certain property Γ. Each individual has
Γ (independently) with probability p. A random member of the population
is tested and observed to have Γ. What is the probability that it is the
criminal?
This problem has been quite extensively studied in the literature. For
example, Balding and Donnelly [1] give a detailed account of the island prob-
lem as well as of its generalization to inhomogeneous populations or (alterna-
tively) uncertainty about p. They also discuss the effects of a database search
or a sequential search (i.e., a search which stops when the first Γ-bearer is
found). Dawid and Mortera have studied the generalization of the island
problem to the case where the evidence may be unreliable [2, 3].
The current paper is expository in the sense that some of the above men-
tioned results are reproduced - albeit presented in a somewhat different way
- and a research article in the sense that we consider generalizations which
to our knowledge have not appeared elsewhere. Apart from the expository
versus research nature, there is another duality in this paper, namely the
distinction between the purely mathematical view versus a more applied
viewpoint, and we elaborate on this issue first.
Most texts focus on the “likelihood ratio”, the quantity that transforms
“prior” odds of guilt, that is, before seeing the evidence, into “posterior”
odds after seeing the evidence. There is good reason to do so. Indeed, the
likelihood ratio is often viewed as the weight of the evidence - it is therefore
the quantity of interest for a forensic lab, which is unable or not allowed to
compute prior (or posterior, for that matter) odds, this being the domain
of the court. However, this already implies a first question. Which part of
the available data should be seen as the evidence, and which part is “just”
background information? In other words: which evidence do we consider and
what is the context? Indeed, the weight of the evidence, that is, the value of
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the likelihood ratio, sometimes depends on which of the available information
is regarded as background information or as evidence (and of course also on
the propositions that one is interested in proving). From a purely mathe-
matical point of view, concentrating on the“posterior probabilities”, that is,
the probability that a suspect is guilty, given background information and/or
evidence, settles the issue. Indeed, it is well known ([7]) that the posterior
probabilities are invariant under different choices of the hypotheses as long
as they are “conditionally equivalent given the data”. Hence, from a purely
mathematical point of view, the situation is quite clear, and one should con-
centrate on the posterior probabilities rather than on the likelihood ratios.
However, from a legal perspective things are not so simple. The likelihood
ratio is, as mentioned earlier, supposed to be in the domain of the statistical
expert, but what if this likelihood ratio involves prior probabilities itself?
We will see concrete examples of this in this article, and in these cases the
classical point of view (likelihood ratio is for the expert, the rest is for the
court) does not seem to immediately apply. If we have the choice among
various likelihood ratios, are there reasons to prefer one over the other? Also
this question will be addressed in particular cases in this paper.
For the island problem, the above discussion is relevant as soon as the
population has subpopulations, each with their own Γ-frequency. In that
case, considering the information that the criminal has Γ as information on
the one hand or as evidence on the other, leads to different likelihood ra-
tios, but the posterior odds are (of course) the same. We will go into this
phenomenon in detail, considering subpopulations simultaneously with un-
certainty about to which subpopulation the criminal and the suspect belong,
together with uncertainty about the Γ-frequencies in each of the subpopula-
tions. Another possibility which we will consider is that of Γ-correlation or a
biased search (i.e., the choice of suspect depends on the true identity of the
criminal).
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the clas-
sical island problem. We then consider in Section 3 the effect of having a
biased search protocol, and of having Γ-correlations; we show that these two
different types of having dependencies are strongly related to each other. In
Section 4, we treat the case where the population is a disjoint union of sub-
populations, each with their own Γ-frequency and prior probability of having
issued the criminal. In Section 5, we consider the effect of uncertainty of the
Γ-frequencies, both in a homogeneous and heterogeneous population. In ad-
dition, we investigate the effect on the likelihood ratio of uncertainty about
the criminal’s and the suspect’s subpopulations. Section 6 deals with the
case in which a suspect is found through a match in a database. Finally, in
Section 7 we present a significant number of numerical examples.
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We have tried to include all details of the computations, but at the same
time to state our conclusions in a non-technical and accessible way. Our main
conclusions can be recognized in the text as bulleted (•) lists. As such, we
hope that our contribution is interesting and useful both for mathematicians,
forensic scientists and legal representatives.
2 The classical case
Our starting point is a collection X of N + 1 individuals. All forthcom-
ing random variables are defined on a (non-specified) probability space with
probability measure P . The random variables C and S take values in X and
represent the criminal and the suspect respectively. Furthermore, we have a
characteristic Γ, for which we introduce indicator random variables Γx, taking
value 1 if x ∈ X has the characteristic Γ and 0 otherwise. The Γx are inde-
pendent of (S, C) in the sense that P (Γx = 1 | C = y, S = z) = P (Γx = 1)
for all x, y, z. The number of Γ-bearers is written as U =
∑
x∈X Γx.
We are primarily interested in the conditional probability
P (C = s | S = s,ΓC = Γs = 1);
often we follow the habit of stating the so-called posterior odds in favour of
guilt, that is,
P (C = s | S = s,ΓC = Γs = 1)
P (C 6= s | S = s,ΓC = Γs = 1)
. (2.1)
Since we will often be working conditional on {S = s} we introduce the
notation
Ps(·) = P (· | S = s).
We define the events I := {ΓC = 1}, G := {S = C}, E := {ΓS = 1},
Ex := {Γx = 1} and Gx = {x = C}. We will sometimes refer to the
event I (or similar events) as “information”, and to E (or similar events)
as “evidence”; this is just colloquial use of language, and sometimes we will
view I as part of the evidence.
With this notation, (2.1) reads
Ps(G | I, E)
Ps(Gc | I, E)
,
which can be rewritten in two different ways, namely
Ps(G | I, E)
Ps(Gc | I, E)
=
Ps(E | G, I)
Ps(E | Gc, I)
·
Ps(G | I)
Ps(Gc | I)
(2.2)
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or
Ps(G | I, E)
Ps(Gc | I, E)
=
Ps(I, E | G)
Ps(I, E | Gc)
·
Ps(G)
Ps(Gc)
. (2.3)
The left hand side of these equations is called the posterior odds. In (2.2), we
arrive at the posterior odds by “starting out” with background information
I via the quotient Ps(G | I)/Ps(G
c | I), called the prior odds. These prior
odds are transformed into the posterior odds by multiplication with Ps(E |
G, I)/Ps(E | G
c, I). This latter quotient is called the likelihood ratio and
is supposed to be a measure of the strength of the evidence E. On the
other hand, in (2.3) we “start out” from prior odds Ps(G)/Ps(G
c), that is,
we interpreted both I and E as evidence. The likelihood ratio in that case
is Ps(I, E | G)/Ps(I, E | G
c) and measures the “combined” strength of the
evidence I and E.
In this section treating the classical case, we assume that C and S are
independent and that C is uniformly distributed on X . Furthermore, the Γx
are independent and identically Bernoulli distributed with success probability
p. These assumptions are not without problems when applied to concrete
legal cases. The assumption that C is uniformly distributed means that we a
priori regard each member of the population equally likely to be the criminal.
It is probably the case that computations based on this assumption cannot be
used as legal evidence. However, many of the computations below can also
be done with other choices for the distribution of C. Having a particular
choice in mind does allow us to compare various formulas in a meaningful
way. The independence and equidistribution of the Γx will be relaxed later on
in this paper, in various ways: one can consider subpopulations with different
frequencies, allow dependencies between the Γx or incorporate uncertainty in
the probability p. Also the independence between C and S will be relaxed
later on.
The outcomes in the current section do not depend on the particular s
we condition on, but for the sake of consistency, we do write Ps instead of P .
We abbreviate E := ES. The independence between S and C now implies
that Ps(G) = 1/(N + 1). Both likelihood ratios in (2.2) and (2.3) are equal
to 1/p. It easily follows that
Ps(G | I, E)
Ps(Gc | I, E)
=
1
p
·
Ps(G | I)
Ps(Gc | I)
=
1
p
·
Ps(G)
Ps(Gc)
=
1
Np
. (2.4)
In this case it does not really matter which viewpoint one takes: the likelihood
is a function of p alone, and does not involve any prior knowledge. Of course,
as mentioned before, in a legal setting it is not clear that uniform priors are
acceptable or useful, and starting from other prior probabilities is of course
possible in this framework.
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In the next two subsections we will examine (for the classical case) how
Ps(G | I, E) is related to the random variable U . It turns out that we may
express Ps(G | I, E) both as the inverse of the expectation of U and as the
expectation of the inverse of U , as long as we condition correctly.
2.1 Expected number of Γ-bearers.
Before anyone is tested for Γ, U has a Bin(N + 1, p)-distribution. When the
crime is committed and it is observed that the criminal has Γ, we condition
on ΓC = 1 and obtain
Ps(U = k + 1 | I) =
Ps(I | U = k + 1)Ps(U = k + 1)
Ps(I)
=
k+1
N+1
(
N+1
k+1
)
pk+1(1− p)N−k
p
=
(
N
k
)
pk(1− p)N−k.
It follows that the probability that U = k + 1, given I, is equal to the
probability that a random variable with a Bin(N, p)-distribution takes value
k, i.e., U | I is distributed as 1+Bin(N, p). Hence, writing Es for expectation
with respect to Ps, we have
Es(U | I) = 1 +Np.
Thus, the posterior probability of guilt is given by the inverse of the expected
number of Γ-bearers, where this expectation takes into account that there is
a specific individual - the criminal - who has Γ:
Ps(G | E, I) =
1
Es(U | I)
. (2.5)
Intuitively this makes sense: the criminal is a Γ-bearer, any one of the Γ-
bearers is equally likely to be the criminal, and we have found one of them. So
we have to compute the expected number of Γ-bearers, given the knowledge
that C is one of them.
2.2 Expected inverse number of Γ-bearers
As we have seen, U | I is distributed as 1+Bin(N, p). Therefore, one expects
Es(U | I) = 1+Np bearers of Γ. If we in addition also condition on ΓS = 1,
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we compute
Ps(U = k | E, I) =
Ps(E | U = k, I)Ps(U = k | I)
Ps(E | I)
=
k
N+1
Ps(U = k | I)
1+Np
N+1
=
k
1 +Np
Ps(U = k | I).
We use this calculation to obtain:
Es(U
−1 | E, I) =
N+1∑
k=1
1
k
Ps(U = k | E, I) (2.6)
=
N+1∑
k=1
1
k
k
1 +Np
Ps(U = k | I) (2.7)
=
1
1 +Np
. (2.8)
Summarizing,
Ps(G | E, I) = (Es(U | I))
−1 = Es(U
−1 | I, E). (2.9)
So Ps(G | I, E) is in fact also equal to the expectation of U
−1, however, not
of U | I but of U | I, E. This can be understood in an intuitive way: both S
and C have Γ, they have been sampled with replacement, so the probability
that they are equal is the inverse of the number of Γ-bearers. This number
is unknown, so we have to take expectations, given knowledge of S and C.
When we compare this explanation with the one of (2.5), we see the
importance of careful conditioning.
2.3 Effect of a search, Yellin’s formula
So far, S and ΓS were supposed to be independent of each other. In this
subsection, we consider a different situation. The random variable C rep-
resenting the criminal is still supposed to be uniformly distributed, but the
definition of S is different: we repeatedly select from X - with or without
replacement - until a Γ-bearer is found, without keeping any records on the
search itself, such as its duration. The Γ-bearer found this way is denoted by
S; if there is no Γ-bearer in the population, we set S = ∗, and define Γ∗ = 0.
As before we write E = {ΓS = 1} and note that in this situation I ⊆ E.
7
As above, we are interested in Ps(G | E, I) which, since I ⊆ E, reduces
to Ps(G | I), and this conditional probability is easy to compute:
Ps(G | E, I) = Ps(G | I) =
N∑
k=0
k−1Ps(U = k | I)
= Es(U
−1 | I). (2.10)
This formula was published by Yellin in [10] as the solution to this version
of the island problem with a search. Sometimes, however, it is incorrectly
quoted in the literature (e.g. in [1]) as an incorrect solution to the island
problem without search as we have discussed it.
2.4 Conclusions
• The classical version of the island problem is not difficult to solve, but
the relation between the probability of guilt and the expected number
of Γ-bearers is rather subtle. The basic formula is
Ps(G | I, E) = (Es(U | I))
−1 = Es(U
−1 | I, E) =
1
1 +Np
.
• In the case of a search we have I ⊆ E and this leads to
Ps(G | E, I) = Es(U
−1 | I).
These outcomes are independent of s.
• For the value of the likelihood ratio, it does not matter whether or not
one interprets I as background information or as evidence - in both
cases the value is 1/p and this quantity does not depend on any prior
knowledge.
• The prior odds, the likelihood ratio and (hence) the posterior odds are
all independent of s.
3 Dependencies
In this section we relax the condition that the Γx are independent random
variables or that S and C are independent. To this end, we define
cx,y = P (Γx = 1 | Γy = 1), (3.1)
σx,y = P (S = x | C = y, I). (3.2)
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3.1 Independent Γx
First we assume that the Γx are independent (not necessarily identically
distributed) random variables, but C and S are not. This is the case, for
instance, in a biased search situation. It also accounts for selection effects,
where certain members of the population are more likely to become a suspect
than others. We write px for P (Γx = 1). Now (2.1) becomes
Ps(E | G, I)Ps(G | I)
Ps(E | Gc, I)Ps(Gc | I)
=
P (E | G, S = s, I)
P (E | Gc, S = s, I)
P (G | S = s, I)
P (Gc | S = s, I)
=
1
ps
P (G, S = s | I)
P (Gc, S = s | I)
=
1
ps
P (S = s | C = s, I)
P (S = s | C 6= s, I)
P (C = s | I)
P (C 6= s | I)
=
1
ps
σs,sP (C 6= s | I)∑
y 6=s σs,yP (C = y | I)
P (C = s | I)
P (C 6= s | I)
(3.3)
In this last expression (3.3), the first term 1/ps is the likelihood ratio
in case of a search such that σs,s = σs,y for all y 6= s, i.e., such that the
probability of selecting s is independent of C. In particular, this holds for
a search where S is uniformly random but other distributions of (S, C) may
also satisfy this criterion.
The middle term in (3.3) is the term that accounts for the bias of the
search, i.e., it expresses the effect of the dependence between S and C in the
case S = s.
The last term of (3.3) is the “prior odds”, the odds in favour of C = s,
when I is taken into account. It is of course also possible to start from “prior
odds” P (C = s)/P (C 6= s); this will yield the same posterior odds, but a
different expression for the likelihood ratio. We will make this explicit for
some special cases later on.
3.2 Arbitrary Γx
We now assume again that S and C are independent, but we drop the as-
sumption that the Γx are independent. In that case, we can write
Ps(G | I, E)
Ps(Gc | I, E)
=
Ps(E | G, I)
Ps(E | Gc, I)
Ps(G | I)
Ps(Gc | I)
=
Ps(G | I)
Ps(E,Gc | I)
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Since we have assumed that the Γi are independent of S and C, we have
Ps(E | I, C = y) = P (Γs = 1 | Γy = 1) = cs,y,
and we continue as
Ps(G | I)
Ps(E,Gc | I)
=
Ps(G | I)∑
y 6=s Ps(E,C = y | I)
=
Ps(G | I)∑
y 6=s Ps(E | C = y, I)Ps(C = y | I)
=
Ps(G | I)∑
y 6=s cs,yPs(C = y | I)
(3.4)
=
1
ps
Ps(G
c | I)∑
y 6=s
cs,y
ps
Ps(C = y | I)
Ps(G | I)
Ps(Gc | I)
. (3.5)
As for the case of a biased search, the term 1/ps is the likelihood ratio
that we obtain in the case where the Γ-correlations do not play a role, i.e.,
when cs,y = ps for all y 6= s. The middle term, analogously to (3.3),
Ps(C 6= s | I)∑
y 6=s
cs,y
ps
Ps(C = y | I)
=
Ps(C 6= s | I)∑
y 6=s
cy,s
py
Ps(C = y | I)
(3.6)
accounts for the Γ-correlations, and the last term
Ps(G | I)
Ps(Gc | I)
=
P (C = s | I)
P (C 6= s | I)
describes the prior odds, conditional on I = {ΓC = 1}. If we remove this
conditioning, we get
Ps(G | I, E)
Ps(Gc | I, E)
=
Ps(G)∑
y 6=s cy,sPs(C = y)
(3.7)
=
1
ps
Ps(C 6= s)∑
y 6=s
cy,s
ps
Ps(C = y)
Ps(G)
Ps(Gc)
. (3.8)
As for (3.5), the last line contains three terms: the likelihood ratio 1/ps
in the uncorrelated case, the term due to the correlation and the prior odds.
Finally, note that (3.4) and (3.7) imply
Ps(G | I, E)
Ps(Gc | I, E)
=
Ps(G | I)∑
y 6=s cs,yPs(C = y | I)
=
Ps(G)∑
y 6=s cy,sPs(C = y)
(3.9)
(or equivalently, the symmetry between the middle terms in (3.5) and (3.8)):
the way the correlation between the Γi appear in the posterior odds depends
on whether or not one considers I = {ΓC = 1} to be evidence, or an event
upon which everything is conditional.
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3.3 Comparison of biased search and Γ-correlations
When we compare the posterior odds (3.3) and (3.5) of the two situations, we
see that the expressions are very similar. Both have a correction factor in the
denominator. In fact, when S and C are independent, then in (3.5) Ps can
be replaced with P , and the two cases reduce to each other if σx,y/σx,x = cx,y
for all x 6= y. A trivial example of this is obtained when C is uniform on
X and the Γx are independent Bernoulli random variables. More generally,
every case of a biased search without Γ-correlations where the correlation
coefficients between criminal and suspect are such that 0 ≤ py
σx,x
σx,y
≤ 1 is
equivalent (as far as the probability of guilt is considered) to a case where
the search is unbiased but the Γx are correlated with coefficients cx,y = py
σx,x
σx,y
.
4 Heterogeneous populations
In this section we consider the situation where the population consists of
several subpopulations, each with their own Γ-frequency and each with their
own probability of containing the criminal. To model this, we write X as a
disjoint union of subpopulations Xi:
X = X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xm, (4.1)
with Xi∩Xj = ∅ whenever i 6= j. If x ∈ Xi, we say that x is in subpopulation
i and write i = X(x). Let Ni = |Xi| be the size of subpopulation Xi. We
write Nx = Ni if i = X(x). Let
P (C ∈ Xi) = βi, (4.2)
where the βi’s are positive and satisfy
∑m
i=1 βi = 1. We assume that the
random variables Γx are independent Bernoulli variables with probability of
success pX(x); hence they are not identically distributed as their distribution
varies for different subpopulations.
4.1 Posterior probability of guilt
It follows from the above that we have cx,y = px for all x, y ∈ X . Therefore,
it follows from (3.5) and (3.7) that
Ps(G | I, E)
Ps(Gc | I, E)
=
1
ps
Ps(G | I)
Ps(Gc | I)
=
Ps(G
c)∑
i=1 piβi − psPs(G)
Ps(G)
Ps(Gc)
(4.3)
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We can work this out in more detail in the case where S and C are
independent and C is uniform on subpopulations:
P (C = x | C ∈ X(x)) = 1/Nx. (4.4)
This assumption is not a restriction, since we assume that all Γx are inde-
pendent. It is always possible to split up the population into parts such that
the Γx are i.i.d. on the parts and (4.4) holds (a trivial decomposition would
be into singletons).
First, we define αi to be the probability that C ∈ Xi, given that C has
Γ:
αi = P (C ∈ Xi | I) =
P (I | C ∈ Xi)P (C ∈ Xi)
P (I)
=
piβi∑m
j=1 pjβj
. (4.5)
Now, P (C = x) = αx/Nx and P (C = x | I) = βx/Nx, and (4.3) can be
rewritten as
Ps(G | I, E)
Ps(Gc | I, E)
=
1
ps
αs
Ns − αs
=
1
Ns
∑
i=1 pi
βi
βs
− ps
. (4.6)
4.2 Likelihood ratios
It follows from (4.6) that, whether S and C are independent or not, the
likelihood ratio conditioned on I is given by
Ps(E | G, I)
Ps(E | Gc, I)
=
1
ps
. (4.7)
If we assume independence of S and C and that C restricted to each sub-
population is uniform, then we obtain
Ps(I, E | G)
Ps(I, E | Gc)
=
Ns − βs
Ns
∑m
j=1 pjβj − psβs
. (4.8)
We note two special cases. First, when Ns is large which means that the
prior probability of guilt for s is small), (4.8) is approximately equal to
1∑m
j=1 pjβj
, (4.9)
in which the subpopulation to which s belongs plays no special role. A second
special case arises when we take Ns = 1, and only one other subpopulation.
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This is the standard practice for many forensic labs: there is a default popu-
lation (the local population), and only two hypotheses are considered: either
S = C, or C is from the default population. In that case, the likelihood ratio
(4.8) is equal to
1
pdef
, (4.10)
where pdef is the Γ-frequency in the default population and βdef , the prior
probability that C is from the default population, is equal to 1− βs.
4.3 Discussion
It seems that (at least) two likelihood ratios can be used to answer the
informal question “What is the weight of the evidence that the suspect has
the same characteristic as the criminal?”. Contrary to the classical case
described in Section 2, the weight of the evidence depends on whether or not
we consider the fact that the criminal has Γ to be evidence or background
information. Depending on that choice and on the prior odds on guilt for S,
we may arrive at the reciprocal of either ps, pdef , or
∑
pjβj. These quantities
may be very different. This articulates the fact that one should be very
careful with the use of such likelihood ratios, and that one should primarily
be interested in posterior odds rather than in likelihood ratios. A similar
warning in a different situation can be found in [6] and [7].
On the other hand, if one wants to divide the ingredients in the compu-
tation of the posterior odds into parts that are for the court to decide, and
parts that are for an expert witness to provide, one faces difficulties. We will
now go into these in some detail.
4.3.1 Choice of evidence
The difference between the choice of conditioning on I or not, is directly
related to the difference between the questions “What is the probability that
S has Γ, if innocent?” and “What is the probability that C has Γ, if S is
innocent?”; or more informally “How else can we explain that S has Γ?”
versus “How else can we explain that C has Γ?” Indeed, if we consider both
I and E as evidence to be expressed by a single likelihood ratio, then we
can first consider E, and then I given E. But without knowledge of I, the
probability that S has Γ is the same under G as under Gc, so the likelihood
ratio of I and E together is in fact the same as the likelihood ratio of I, given
E. Thus, the issue here is that we need to decide if the fact that C has Γ
counts as evidence against S, or not. Should the fact that C has a certain
characteristic count as (legal) evidence against someone, because he belongs
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to a subpopulation in which the characteristic is more common? Or do we
only consider the fact that S has the characteristic, knowing that C has it,
as evidence? It seems unlikely that an answer can be given in full generality,
but it is important to realize that the value of the evidence will depend on
it.
4.3.2 Role of expert
Legal systems generally wish to make a distinction between the strength of
the evidence, and the strength of the case. Ideally, the expert witness informs
the court about the strength of the evidence (i.e., gives a Likelihood Ratio),
and the court combines this information with its prior to draw conclusions
about the strength of the case. The prior is not discussed with, or commu-
nicated to, the expert. Hence, for this to be possible, the likelihood ratio
should not depend on the prior of the court. Looking at (4.8) however, it is
apparent that this likelihood ratio does depend on the prior probabilities βi
and on the suspect’s population size Ns. The value of the legal evidence, if
taken to be both I and E, thus is a function of the prior and seems as such
to be generally not admissible in court. In the special case (4.10), however,
it is; but in that case we only obtain useful information if the assumption
that either S = C, or C is from the default population, is justified.
The Likelihood Ratio (4.7) does not suffer from these problems: it is a
function of the suspect’s subpopulation only, irrespective of any prior, on S
or on any other person or group. Thus, if a court has somehow arrived at
a prior probability αs = P (C ∈ Xs | I), it can use the expert’s information
ps to proceed. But it must now be made clear to the court that there is a
distinction between the priors with or without I taken into account, and that
to compute one from the other it also needs expert information.
4.3.3 In practice: which likelihood ratio?
We end this discussion by pointing out some pro’s and cons of the likelihood
ratios (4.7) and (4.8). Clearly, (4.7) only involves the suspect. This is a con-
ceptually satisfactory property, since it allows for a clear distinction between
prior probabilities and the value of the evidence, as we have pointed out
above. It may also provide a safeguard against using irrelevant information
as evidence. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical scenario: at
a crime scene, a hair of C is found. Analysis by a forensic hair expert shows
that C must belong to subpopulation X1. Later, a suspect S ∈ X1 is found.
From the hair a mitochondrial DNA profile is generated, and S’s mitochon-
drial DNA profile matches with it. The court wishes to be informed about
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the value of that match. Clearly, it only makes sense to report ps, since it is
at this point already known that S and C are from the same subpopulation.
But the DNA expert may not know this, and if it is standard procedure to
report a variant of (4.8), e.g. (4.10), then a profile frequency for the default,
or even the world’s population, could be reported.
On the other hand, an advantage of (4.8) is that it reduces the value of the
evidence if there is a plausible alternative to S for C: if there are other groups
in which Γ is relatively frequent, and which have a positive prior probability,
then (4.8) decreases whereas (4.7) does not. But as we have seen, (4.8) can
only do this because it makes use of all the prior probabilities, and as such
it is likely to be inadmissible as legal evidence, especially if the court leaves
the choice of prior to the expert. A possible way out would be for the expert
to report all the pj separately to the court.
Of course, in practice ps may be hard for the expert to determine, because
he only has data about other populations, or because it is not immediately
clear to which subpopulation S belongs, or even what the subpopulations
themselves are. In that case, it may be practical (though potentially dan-
gerous) to use (4.10) and report pdef (together with the hypotheses!), if it is
the only statistic concerning Γ that the expert has knowledge of.
The difference in numerical value of (4.7) and (4.8) may lead to the pros-
ecution and defence having different preferences for the use of (4.7) or (a
variant of) (4.8). For example, if ps is much smaller than the weighted mean∑
pjβj, the prosecution will prefer (4.7), but the defence will point out that
in the population as a whole, there are subpopulations in which Γ is much
more common, and therefore try to persuade the court that (4.8) better re-
flects the value of the match. The court should realize that both points of
view can be justified: the prosecutor focuses on the suspect and comes up
with the likelihood that S has Γ, if not guilty; the defence focuses on C and
points out that S need not be C, since there are other good candidates. The
court should realize that these arguments can be both valid.
To better understand the influence of uncertainty about the Γ-frequencies
in the different populations and about the suspect’s and the criminal’s sub-
population, we proceed with a more detailed model involving these issues in
Section 5.
4.4 Expected number of Γ-bearers
If we choose βi = Ni/N as we did in the classical case, then we can again
express the posterior probability of guilt as the inverse of the expected num-
ber of Γ-bearers. We compute Es(U | I, C ∈ Xs) =
∑
iNipi + 1 − ps =
15
Ns
∑
i pi
Ni
Ns
− ps + 1, and from (4.6) it follows that
Ps(G | I, E) =
1
Es(U | I, C ∈ Xs)
, (4.11)
which is the analogue of (2.5). The reader may check that similarly,
Ps(G | I, E) = Es(U
−1 | I, E, C ∈ Xs).
This is the analogue of (2.9).
4.5 Without conditioning on S = s
Assume that S is uniformly distributed on X , and suppose we do not con-
dition on {S = s}. Concentrating on the conditional probability of G we
obtain
P (G | I, E) =
∑
s∈X
P (G | I, E, S = s)P (S = s | I, E). (4.12)
The first term in the summation is computed above already, so we need only
to compute P (S = s | I, E). Since information about S and its Γ-status does
not say anything about ΓC , we have that
P (S = s | I, E) = P (S = s | ΓS = 1)
=
P (ΓS = 1 | S = s)P (S = s)∑
s∈X P (Γs = 1 | S = s)P (S = s)
=
ps∑
s∈X ps
.
Hence it follows that
P (G | E, I) =
∑
s∈X psZs∑
s∈X ps
,
where
Zs = Ps(G | I, E) =
αs
ps(Ns − αs) + αs
.
Hence the posterior probability of guilt is a weighted average of the condi-
tioned ones, with weights ps.
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4.6 Conclusions
• The probability of guilt in this situation is equal to
Ps(G | I, E) =
αs
ps(Ns − αs) + αs
,
and this answer depends on s via the frequency of Γ in the subpopula-
tion of s, the distribution of C and the size of the subpopulation of s.
The sizes of the other subpopulations do not play a role other than in
the assessment of the βi and thereby of the αi, i.e., in the distribution
of C.
• For the value of the likelihood ratio, it does matter whether or not I is
interpreted as background information or evidence. For the probability
of guilt this distinction is - of course - irrelevant, but we have seen that
there can be reasons to have preference for a particular choice. It
is preferable to use a likelihood ratio which does not involve any prior
knowledge. The prior should then, in theory, be estimated by the juror.
• The probability of guilt, conditioning only on the fact that the sus-
pect has Γ but not on the identity (subpopulation) of the suspect, is
the weighted average of the individual conditional probabilities, with
weight factors ps. The sizes of the subpopulations and the distribution
of C do not play a role in the weights.
5 Uncertainty about the frequency of Γ
In this section we assume that the Γ-frequency P (Γx = 1) is not known with
certainty. Instead, we describe the frequency with a probability distribution.
5.1 Classical case
We assume that there are no subpopulations. The random variable C is
uniform on X , and S and C are independent. To model the uncertainty of
the Γ-frequency, we assume that there is a random variable W , taking values
in [0, 1] and with density χ, such that conditional on W = r, the Γx are
independent Bernoulli variables with P (Γx = 1) = r. We let p denote the
expectation ofW and σ2 its variance. We again condition on S = s whenever
we compute odds, but all results in this section are independent of s.
Definition 5.1. The distribution of W is called the prior-to-crime distribu-
tion and the distribution of W conditioned on I is called the prior-to-suspect
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distribution. Finally, the distribution of W conditioned on both I and E
is called the post-match distribution. The densities of these three random
variables are denoted by χ, χI and χI,E respectively.
Since
P (I) =
∫ 1
0
P (I | W = t)χ(t)dt =
∫ 1
0
tχ(t)dt = p,
the continuous version of Bayes’ theorem implies that
χI(t) =
P (I |W = t)χ(t)
P (I)
=
t
p
χ(t). (5.1)
Furthermore, we have
χI,E(t) =
1 +Nt
1 +N(p + σ2/p)
χI(t). (5.2)
To see this, note that
χI,E(t) =
P (E |W = t, I)χI(t)
P (E | I)
(5.3)
and compute the denominator:
P (E | I) =
∫ 1
0
P (E | W = t, I)χI(t)dt (5.4)
=
∫ 1
0
1 +Nt
1 +N
t
p
χ(t)dt (5.5)
=
1
(1 +N)p
(p+N(p2 + σ2)) (5.6)
=
1 +N(p + σ
2
p
)
1 +N
. (5.7)
From this, the claim readily follows.
The expectation of W given I is expressed in terms of χ by
p′ := E(W | I) =
∫ 1
0
tχI(t)dt =
∫ 1
0
1
p
t2χ(t)dt =
1
p
(p2 + σ2). (5.8)
The expected number of Γ-bearers, given I is now given by
E(U | I) =
∫ 1
0
E(U | I,W = t)χI(t)dt =
∫ 1
0
(1 +Nt)χI(t)dt = 1 +Np
′.
(5.9)
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As in the classical case where σ2 = 0 (cf. (2.5)), the inverse of this expression
is equal to the posterior probability of guilt, since
Ps(G | I, E) =
∫ 1
0
Ps(G | I, E,W = t)χI,E(t)dt (5.10)
=
∫ 1
0
1
1 +Nt
1 +Nt
1 +N(p+ σ2/p)
χIdt (5.11)
=
1
1 +N(p + σ2/p)
=
1
1 +Np′
. (5.12)
Since the prior probability of guilt is just 1/(N +1) as before, the likelihood
ratio is 1/p′. Since this likelihood ratio is not controversial in this case,
we concentrate on the posterior probability of guilt in terms of the various
conditional distributions.
As in the classical case (cf. (2.8)), we also have Ps(G | I, E) = Es(U
−1 |
I, E). Indeed,
Es(U
−1 | I, E) =
∫ 1
0
Es(U
−1 | I, E,W = t)χI,E(t)dt (5.13)
=
∫ 1
0
1
1 +Nt
1 +Nt
1 +N(p + σ2)
χI(t)dt (5.14)
=
1
1 +N(p+ σ2/p)
. (5.15)
The expectation p′ only depends on χ and not on the population size.
This is to be expected, since learning that a (randomly chosen) population
member has Γ is not informative about the population size. This changes
when we learn E, the fact that a randomly selected islander has Γ as well.
Indeed, in a small population this is more likely to happen since we are more
likely to accidentally select the criminal. In the extreme case where N = 0,
E can not offer any new information, but for other N , it does. It follows
from (5.2) that
p′′ := Es(W | I, E) =
∫ 1
0
tχI,E(t)dt
=
1
1 +N(p + σ2/p)
∫ 1
0
t(1 +Nt)
t
p
χ(t)dt
=
1
1 +N(p + σ2/p)
(
p+
σ2
p
+
N
p
∫ 1
0
t3χ(t)dt
)
.
We can also write
p′′ =
1
1 +Np′
(
p′ +N(σ2W |I + p
′2)
)
,
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if we want to express p′′ in terms of χI , where σ
2
W |I denotes the variance of
χI . The above formula can be rewritten as
p′′ = p′
1 +N(σ2W |I/p
′ + p′)
1 +Np′
≥ p′,
with equality only if σ2W |I = 0 or N = 0 (as expected, cf. the remark above).
It is perhaps worth mentioning that one can reconstruct χI from χI,E and
χ from χI . Indeed we have
χI(t) =
χI,E(t)
1 +Nt
(∫ 1
0
χI,E(s)ds
1 +Ns
)−1
(5.16)
and
χ(t) =
(
t
∫ 1
0
χI(x)
x
dx
)−1
χI(t). (5.17)
To see this, note that from (5.2) we have
χI(t) =
1 +Np′
1 +Nt
χI,E(t). (5.18)
On the other hand, it follows from (5.15) that
Es(U
−1 | I, E) =
∫ 1
0
1
1 +Ns
χI,E(s)ds =
1
1 +Np′
,
and the first claim (5.16) follows.
For (5.17) we simply note from (5.1) that
χ(t) =
p
t
χI(t), (5.19)
where p =
∫ 1
0
tχ(t)dt. Integrating this equation gives
1 = p
∫ 1
0
χI(t)
t
dt = 1
and this expresses p in terms of χI . Substituting this into (5.19) gives (5.17).
As a conclusion, we have seen that
p′′ ≥ p′ ≥ p,
so one has
1
1 +Np′′
≤
1
1 +Np′
≤
1
1 +Np
.
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5.1.1 Conclusions
• The basic formula of Conclusions 2.4 still holds: using (5.9), (5.12) and
(5.15), we see that the probability of guilt is given by
Ps(G | I, E) = Es(U
−1 | I, E) = Es(U | I)
−1 =
1
1 +Np′
.
• The conditional probability of guilt expressed in terms of χ is
Ps(G | I, E) =
1
1 +N(p + σ2/p)
. (5.20)
Therefore, ignoring the uncertainty (i.e., using p instead of p′), is un-
favourable to the suspect. If, on the other hand, one incorrectly as-
sumes that there is uncertainty, then this is favourable to the suspect.
• The conditional probability of guilt expressed in terms of χI is
Ps(G | I, E) =
1
1 +Np′
. (5.21)
In this case, the uncertainty in χI is irrelevant in the sense that its
variance plays no role.
• The conditional probability of guilt expressed in terms of χI,E is
Ps(G | I, E) =
∫ 1
0
1
1 +Nt
χI,E(t)dt. (5.22)
Ignoring the uncertainty in χI,E (obtaining Ps(G | I, E) = 1/(1+Np
′′))
would be favourable to the suspect.
5.2 Uncertainty about the criminal’s subpopulation
Suppose that, as in Section 4, the population is divided into subpopulations
X = X1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xm, and that C has characteristic Γ. We let Wi be the
random variable modelling the frequency of Γ in Xi. The expectation resp.
variance ofWi are denoted by pi resp. σ
2
i . So, if X(x) 6= X(y) then Γx and Γy
are independent, and furthermore conditional on Wi = pi the Γx for x ∈ Xi
are independent Bernoulli variables with probability of success pi. We write
E = Es and G = Gs as before. Contrary to the situation in 4.1, the division
of X into subpopulations is a real restriction: the Γx are only independent
between subpopulations, not within one (only exchangeable).
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5.2.1 Unconditioned on I
We first interpret I as evidence, not as background information. The poste-
rior probability of guilt, given that S = s ∈ Xs and C has Γ, is
Ps(G | I, E) = Ps(G | C ∈ Xs, I, E)Ps(C ∈ Xs | I, E).
The first term in the right hand side equals (see (5.12))
Ps(G | C ∈ Xs, I, E) =
1
1 + (Ns − 1)(ps + σ2s/ps)
,
since we are now back in the setting of a homogeneous population. The
second term equals (cf. (5.7),(4.5))
Ps(C ∈ Xs | I, E) =
Ps(E | C ∈ Xs, I)Ps(C ∈ Xs | I)
Ps(E | I)
,
=
1+(Ns−1)(ps+σ2s/ps)
Ns
psβs∑m
j=1 pjβj
Ps(E | I)
.
It remains to compute Ps(E | I):
Ps(E | I) =
m∑
j=1
Ps(E | C ∈ Xj)Ps(C ∈ Xj | I)
=
m∑
j=1,j 6=X(s)
ps
pjβj∑m
k=1 pkβk
+
1 + (Ns − 1)(ps + σ
2
s/ps)
Ns
psβs∑m
k=1 pkβk
=
Ns
∑
j=1,j 6=X(s) psβjpj + (1 + (Ns − 1)(ps + σ
2
s/ps))βsps
Ns
∑m
k=1 βkpk
.
Putting the parts together yields
Ps(G | I, E) =
1
1 +Ns
∑m
j=1
βj
βs
pj + (Ns − 1)
σ2s
ps
− ps
. (5.23)
This is the analogue of (4.6). For large Ns, the probability of guilt is roughly
equal to
Ps(G | I, E) ≈
1
Ns(
∑m
j=1
βj
βs
pj + σ2s/ps)
. (5.24)
The odds on guilt are then roughly equal to
Ps(G | I, E)
Ps(Gc | I, E)
=
1
Ns(
∑m
j=1
βj
βs
pj +
σ2s
ps
)
=
βs
Ns
1∑m
j=1 βjpj + βs
σ2s
ps
. (5.25)
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The weight of the evidence, the likelihood ratio, is given by
Ps(E, I | G)
Ps(E, I | Gc)
=
Ns − βs
Ns
∑m
j=1 pjβj +Ns(p
′
s − ps)− p
′
sβs
, (5.26)
(where p′s = ps +
σ2s
ps
as before) which reduces to (4.8) if p′s = ps. For large
populations, (5.26) is roughly equal to
1∑m
j=1 βjpj + βsσ
2
s/ps
, (5.27)
as is also clear from (5.25). This formula is the analogue of (4.9). The
likelihood ratio (5.27) suffers from the same problem as (4.9) in the sense
that the prior probabilities βs are needed to compute it. For the same reason
as before, it is therefore highly questionable whether the expert is allowed
to report (5.27) in court. Therefore, we proceed by working conditional on
I and see what the computations tell us there.
5.2.2 Conditional on I
Now, I is interpreted as background information. Let, as in (4.5),
αs = Ps(C ∈ Xs | I) =
psβs∑m
k=1 pjβj
.
Then (5.23) can be rewritten as
Ps(G | I, E) =
1∑
j 6=X(s)Nsps
αj
αs
+ 1 + (Ns − 1)p′s
,
where
p′i = pi +
σ2i
pi
is the expectation of Wi given C ∈ Xi.
Since the prior odds, conditional on I, in favour of guilt of s ∈ Xs are
Ps(G | I)
Ps(Gc | I)
=
αs
Ns − αs
,
the corresponding likelihood ratio is equal to
Ps(E | G, I)
Ps(E | Gc, I)
=
Ns − αs
Nsps(1− αs) + αs(1 + (Ns − 1)p′s)
=
Ns − αs
Nsαs(p′s − ps) +Nsps − p
′
sαs
.
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Of course, this leads to the same posterior probability of guilt as in (5.24).
Notice that when p′s = ps, then this reduces to 1/ps, i.e., we retrieve (4.7).
For large Ns, the likelihood ratio is roughly equal to
1
ps + αs(p′s − ps)
=
ps
p2s + αsσ
2
s
. (5.28)
This likelihood ratio also depends on prior quantities, this time on αs. Note
however that there is a difference between (5.27) and (5.28). The latter only
depends on quantities associated to the suspect’s subpopulation, whereas the
former does not. In this case there is a way to deal with the problem of having
a prior quantity entering the formula for the likelihood ratio. In (5.28) one
can be conservative and take αs = 1 to obtain a number which is not larger
than the true likelihood ratio. In (5.27) one can of course do the same for all
βj ’s but there we have the problem that we have various βj in the expression,
and the only thing we know is that they add up to 1. Therefore, we prefer
(5.28), but the usual care must be exercised when using this likelihood ratio
in court. The use of this likelihood ratio is, as always, dangerous and should
involve a discussion of priors. A likelihood ratio out of context is not useful,
and unfortunately, the context is rather complicated.
5.2.3 Conclusions
• As in the case without uncertainty about the Γ-frequencies, we obtain
two likelihood ratios that quantify the weight of the evidence: for large
populations these are (5.27) if the evidence is taken to be (I, E) and
(5.28) if the evidence is taken to be only E. Sine (5.28) can be easily
be turned into a conservative bound by setting αs = 1, we prefer to
use (5.28), noting however that a report mentioning just the likelihood
ratio without context is dangerous and potentially misleading.
• Only the uncertainty about the frequency of Γ in the suspect’s subpop-
ulation plays a role in the likelihood ratio and the posterior probability
of guilt, the uncertainty in the other subpopulations does not. The
effect of this uncertainty is weighted by the probability that the true
culprit belongs to this subpopulation.
• As in the classical case, if one conditions on I then the likelihood ratio
given by (5.28) for large populations, only contains quantities associ-
ated to the suspect’s subpopulation.
• Contrary to the classical case, if one considers the evidence to be (I, E)
then in the likelihood ratio for large populations (given by (5.27)) the
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suspect’s subpopulation plays a special role, through the uncertainty
about the Γ-frequency in this population.
• Regardless of whether one lets the evidence be I, E or only E, the
greater the uncertainty, the lower the weight of the evidence.
5.3 Uncertainty about the suspect’s and the criminal’s
subpopulation
Suppose now that it is also unknown to which subpopulation s belongs. In
that case we can no longer condition on S = s, but we can use the results of
the previous section by writing
P (G | I, E) =
m∑
i=1
P (G | S ∈ Xi, I, E)P (S ∈ Xi | I, E). (5.29)
We have determined the P (G | S = s, I, E) in (5.23), and it is not difficult
to see that this is equal to P (G | S ∈ Xi, I, E) whenever s ∈ Xi. Hence, we
only need to compute P (s ∈ Xi | I, E).
The distribution of S plays a role now, and we define
ǫi = P (s ∈ Xi)
to be the probability that S belongs to Xi. Then the a priori probability of
guilt is
P (G) = P (C = s) =
m∑
i=1
P (s ∈ Xi)P (C = s | s ∈ Xi) =
m∑
i=1
ǫi
βi
Ni
.
Recall that βi is the probability that C ∈ Xi and that we assume a uniform
distribution over each subpopulation.
We now compute P (S ∈ Xi | I, E):
P (S ∈ Xi | I, E) =
P (E | S ∈ Xi, I)P (S ∈ Xi | I)
P (E | I)
=
P (E | S ∈ Xi, I)P (S ∈ Xi | I)∑m
j=1 P (E | S ∈ Xj , I)P (S ∈ Xj | I)
. (5.30)
It remains to compute P (E | S ∈ Xj , I) and P (S ∈ Xi | I). The latter is
easy: since I is information about C and not about S, we have
P (S ∈ Xi | I) = ǫi.
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The former can be computed as follows:
P (E | S ∈ Xi, I) =
m∑
j=1
P (E | C ∈ Xj , S ∈ Xi, I)P (C ∈ Xj | S ∈ Xi, I).
Now P (C ∈ Xj | S ∈ Xi, I) is the probability that C belongs to Xj, given
that S has been selected from Xi and that C has Γ. However, nothing is
given about S’s Γ-status and therefore S ∈ Xi can not be informative about
C at all, hence
P (C ∈ Xj | S ∈ Xi, I) = P (C ∈ Xj | I) =
pjβj∑m
k=1 pkβk
.
It remains to evaluate the terms P (E | C ∈ Xj, S ∈ Xi, I). If i 6= j then S
and C belong to different populations. If i = j then (5.7) applies, so
P (E | S ∈ Xi, C ∈ Xj , I) =
{
pi i 6= j,
1+(Ni−1)(pi+σ2i /pi)
Ni
i = j.
If we put these ingredients together, we obtain after some computations:
P (E | S ∈ Xi, I) =
pi∑m
k=1 pkβk
(
m∑
j=1
pjβj +
βi
Ni
(1− pi + (Ni − 1)σ
2
i /pi)
)
.
Plugging this into (5.30), we obtain
P (S ∈ Xi | I, E) =
pi(
∑m
k=1 pkβk +
βi
Ni
(1− pi + (Ni − 1)σ
2
i /pi))ǫi∑m
j=1 pj(
∑m
k=1 pkβk +
βj
Nj
(1− pj + (Nj − 1)σ2j /pj))ǫj
=
piǫiβi
NiPs(G | I, E, S ∈ Xi)
1∑m
j=1
pjǫjβj
NjPs(G|I,E,S∈Xj)
(5.31)
Substituting this expression into (5.29), we arrive at the posterior probability
of guilt:
P (G | I, E) =
∑m
i=1
piǫiβi
Ni∑m
i=1
piǫiβi
NiPs(G|I,E,S∈Xi)
. (5.32)
Although this is not immediately obvious in the above presentation, the
expression (5.32) is symmetric in ǫ and β. To show this, notice that we only
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have to prove it for the denominator. Denoting
f(ǫ, β) =
m∑
i=1
piǫiβi
NiPs(G | I, E, S ∈ Xi)
=
m∑
i=1
piβiǫi
Ni
(1 +Ni
m∑
j=1
pjβj/βi + (Ni − 1)σ
2
i /pi − pi),
we compute
f(ǫ, β)− f(β, ǫ) =
m∑
i=1
piβi
(
m∑
j=1
pjβj/βi −
m∑
j=1
pjǫj/ǫi
)
=
m∑
i=1
pi
(
ǫi
m∑
j=1
pjβj − βi
m∑
j=1
pjǫj
)
=
m∑
i,j=1
(piǫipjβj − piβipjǫj)
= 0.
Intuitively, it is clear that (5.32) must possess this symmetry. Indeed, we
have an unknown criminal C and a suspect S, both with Γ. The probability
that S = C depends, as far as ǫ and β are concerned, on how they allow
for S and C to be issued from the same subpopulation. Exchanging the
distributions ǫ and β should not make a difference.
To conclude this section we sketch the behaviour of (5.31) in extreme
situations.
5.3.1 Probability that S ∈ Xi for extreme situations
• If all σ2j = 0 and the Nj are very large (compared to the p
−1
j ), then
(5.31) is approximately equal to
P (S ∈ Xi | I, E) ≈
piǫi∑m
j=1 pjǫj
= P (S ∈ Xi | E).
This is reasonable, since if pi is big compared to 1/Ni, then it is very
unlikely that C = S even when Γ is taken into account. In this case,
knowing that C has Γ does not really alter our belief about S’s sub-
population which we have based on E.
• If all σ2j = 0 and the pj are small compared to the 1/Nj, then
P (S ∈ Xi | I, E) ≈
pi
βi
Ni
ǫi∑m
j=1 pj
βj
Nj
ǫj
=
1∑m
j=1
pj
pi
βj
βi
Ni
Nj
ǫj
ǫi
. (5.33)
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If ǫi = Ni/N , then (5.33) reduces to
P (S ∈ Xi | I, E) ≈
piβi∑m
i=1 pjβj
= P (C ∈ Xi | I), (5.34)
which is also reasonable, since for very small Γ-frequencies it is quite
likely that C = S.
• If also βi = Ni/N , then (5.33) reduces to
P (S ∈ Xi | I, E) ≈
Nipi∑m
i=1Njpj
, (5.35)
and this is also understandable: if there is no information about the
identity of C or S, then the probability that S ∈ Xi is proportional to
the expected number of Γ-bearers in that subpopulation.
6 Database search
In this section we suppose that there is a database D ⊂ X containing the
Γ-status of individuals x1, . . . , xn. After possibly renumbering, we write X =
{x1, . . . , xN+1} and let D = {x1, . . . , xn}. Suppose that
∑
d∈D Γd = k, that
is, there are k matches in the database. Let the evidence ED be given by
ED = {Γx1 = · · · = Γxk = 1,Γxk+1 = · · · = Γxn = 0}.
We also assume that P (C = xi | I) = αi and that each individual has Γ with
probability p.
There are several pairs of propositions whose support by the data can
be considered. These propositions all give rise to their own likelihood ratios
or posterior probabilities, which has caused considerable confusion in the
literature; see [6] for an account on this. Some of the forthcoming discussion
also appears in [6] but we recall it here for completeness.
We will discuss three ways of looking at database matches. The most
interesting case is where the database search produces a single match. Indeed,
if there are no matches then the inquiry comes to an end as far as the database
is concerned and if there are several matches, then it is clear that chance
matches have occurred:
1. Database-focused: in this case, the quantity of interest is P (C ∈ D |
ED, I), the probability that the criminal is in the database;
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2. Individual-focused: in this case, the quantity of interest is P (C = x1 |
ED, I), the conditional probability that C = x1 supposing that x1 has
Γ;
3. Database effectiveness: in this case, the quantity of interest is P (S =
C | E1, I), the probability that S = C where E1 denotes the event that
k = 1 (a unique match, but not specified with whom), and where S is
the label of the matching individual.
6.1 Database-focused
First, we consider the proposition, found e.g. in [8],
C ∈ D,
and its negation C /∈ D. The prior odds in favour of C ∈ D are
P (C ∈ D | I)
P (C /∈ D | I)
=
α1 + · · ·+ αn
αn+1 + · · ·+ αN+1
,
where αi = P (C = xi | I) is the probability of guilt of xi, given that C has
Γ. Clearly,
P (ED | C /∈ D, I) = p
k(1− p)n−k.
Similarly, it is easy to see that
P (ED | C ∈ D, I) =
pk−1(1− p)n−k(α1 + · · ·+ αk)
α1 + · · ·+ αn
,
and therefore the likelihood ratio of evidence ED in favour of C ∈ D is equal
to
P (ED | C ∈ D, I)
P (ED | C /∈ D, I)
=
α1 + · · ·+ αk
p(α1 + · · ·+ αn)
. (6.1)
The posterior odds in favour of C ∈ D are
P (C ∈ D | ED, I)
P (C /∈ D | ED, I)
=
α1 + · · ·+ αk
p(αn+1 + · · ·+ αN+1)
. (6.2)
If k = 1, C ∈ D becomes logically equivalent to C = x1, and we have
P (C = x1 | ED, I)
P (C /∈ D | ED, I)
=
P (C = x1 | ED, I)
P (C 6= x1 | ED, I)
(6.3)
=
α1
p(αn+1 + · · ·+ αN+1)
=
1
p
P (C = x1 | I)
P (C /∈ D | I)
. (6.4)
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This means that the likelihood ratio is uncontroversial and equal to 1/p. In
fact, it is not difficult to show that (6.3) also holds when the probability of
having Γ differs among the individuals in the database. In that case, p in
(6.3) should be replaced with p1 = P (Γx1 = 1 | I). Therefore, the weight of
the evidence is not influenced by the presence in the database of people of
different ethnic origin other than by the determination of the αi.
6.2 Individual-focused
Of course, the proposition C ∈ D is not really of interest to a court. Rather,
presented with an individual x such that Γx = 1, a court is interested in
P (C = x | ED, I). Therefore, suppose as above that there are k hits in
the database, namely x1, . . . , xk. A computation analogous to the above one
shows that the posterior odds in favour of C = x1 are
P (C = x1 | ED, I)
P (C 6= x1 | ED, I)
=
α1
α2 + · · ·+ αk + p(αn+1 + · · ·+ αN+1)
. (6.5)
Notice that, if k = 1, we retrieve (6.3), as we should.
6.3 Database effectiveness
The most interesting case is when the database produces a unique hit. In
that case, as we have seen, the posterior odds in favour of S = C are given
by (6.3). In this section we investigate a related, but different probability,
namely the probability that if we have a unique database hit, that it is with
the true culprit. This probability represents the long term effectiveness of the
database in selecting the correct individual in the cases where it produces a
unique match. We let E1 denote the event that there is exactly one Γ-bearer
in the database, and we will calculate
P (S = C | E1, I),
where S is the unique individual in the database with Γ. To do so, we write
P (S = C | E1, I) =
n∑
i=1
P (S = C | Γxi = 1, E1, I)P (Γxi = 1 | E1, I).
First notice that (6.3) gives
P (S = C | E1,Γxi = 1, I) =
αi
αi + pP (C /∈ D | I)
,
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and it remains to compute P (Γxi = 1 | E1, I):
P (Γxi = 1 | E1, I) = P (C = xi | E1, I) +
1
n
P (C /∈ D | E1, I)
=
P (E1 | C = xi, I)P (C = xi | I) +
1
n
P (E1 | C /∈ D | I)P (C /∈ D | I)
P (E1 | I)
=
P (E1 | C = xi, I)P (C = xi | I) +
1
n
P (E1 | C /∈ D, I)P (C /∈ D | I)
P (E1 | C ∈ D, I)P (C ∈ D | I) + P (E1 | C /∈ D, I)P (C /∈ D | I)
=
αi + pP (C /∈ D | I)
P (C ∈ D | I) + npP (C /∈ D | I)
,
where in the last step we used that P (E1 | C ∈ D, I) = (1 − p)
n−1 and
P (E1 | C /∈ D, I) = p(1− p)
n−1. It follows that
P (S = C | E1, I) =
n∑
i=1
αi
αi + pP (C /∈ D | I)
αi + pP (C /∈ D | I)
P (C ∈ D | I) + npP (C /∈ D | I)
=
P (C ∈ D | I)
P (C ∈ D | I) + npP (C /∈ D | I)
.
which can also be written in odds form:
P (C ∈ D | E1, I)
P (C /∈ D | E1, I)
=
P (S = C | E1, I)
P (S 6= C | E1, I)
=
1
np
P (C ∈ D | I)
P (C /∈ D | I)
, (6.6)
with corresponding likelihood ration 1/np. If the database is comprised of
individuals coming from different subpopulations, then (6.6) does not hold.
However, in that case one may view the database as a disjoint union D =
D1 ∪ · · · ∪ Dm, where Dm is the subset of D containing individuals from
subpopulation i. For each of these separately, (6.6) holds.
It is rather interesting to see what happens with the odds on S = C
(given E1 and I) when the size of the database grows. It may seem from
(6.6) that as n grows, the odds on S = C decrease. However, this is not
true in general, since P (C ∈ D | I) may also depend on n. It does, however,
mean that enlarging a database does not necessarily improve its effectiveness,
in the sense of increasing the odds (6.6) on a unique match being with the
true offender. For example, suppose that a database Dn of size n yields
P (C ∈ Dn | I) = qn, and that a larger database D2n of size 2n yields
P (C ∈ D2n | I) = q2n. If Dn ⊂ D2n then naturally q2n ≥ qn, but the
probability that S = C given a unique match in D2n is greater than the
probability that S = C given a unique match in Dn only when
q2n
1− q2n
> 2
qn
1− qn
.
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This can be explained intuitively: if one adds many people who are unlikely
to be C to the database, then the probability of a chance match with one
of these new individuals outweighs the fact that the probability that C has
been added to the database has increased in the sense that it becomes less
likely that a unique match actually is a match with the criminal.
Hence the value of a unique match may increase or decrease with the size
of the database, and it is not hard to see that the probability of a unique
match itself may (independently) decrease or increase.
6.4 Conclusions
• If it is known with whom the match is, say with xi, then (cf. (6.3)) the
posterior probability of guilt is given by
P (C = xi | ED, I)
P (C 6= xi | ED, I)
=
αi
pP (C /∈ D | I)
.
Notice that this quantity only depends on αi = P (C = xi | I), on the
likelihood p of a chance match with xi and on the a priori probability
that the database contains the criminal. As the database increases,
P (C /∈ D | I) decreases but depending on αi/p the posterior proba-
bility P (C = xi | ED, I) may be greater or smaller than for a smaller
database.
• If it is not specified with which individual the match is, and the prob-
ability of having Γ is p for everyone in the database, then the posterior
probability that the match is with the criminal is given by, cf. (6.6),
P (S = C | E1, I)
P (S 6= C | E1, I)
=
1
np
P (C ∈ D | I)
P (C /∈ D | I)
.
These odds describe the long-term behaviour of the database, i.e., the
proportion in the long run of unique matches that are matches with
the true criminal. Naturally, enlarging the database always increases
the probability that the criminal is contained in it. But the probability
of a unique match may increase or decrease, and (independently) the
value of a unique match may increase or decrease. In many cases, in an
enlarged database the probability of a unique match increases, but the
probability of a unique match being with the true offender decreases.
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7 Examples
In this section we illustrate the obtained results by considering some exam-
ples. We have chosen to cast most of these examples in a dna-setting, as this
provides one of the few types of forensic evidence that are so well understood
that more or less exact computations can be performed.
The uncertainty surrounding DNA-profile frequency estimates depends
on the size of the database from which allele frequencies are estimated. A
possible model is to define a prior distribution of allele frequencies, and to
update this distribution with the database to obtain a posterior distribution.
An often used approach is to use Dirichlet distributions (see [9] for an account
of the method and a discussion on the sensitivity for the choice of prior).
Doing this for a database containing alleles of 230 persons (for many forensic
labs the actual size of their database is a few hundred individuals), it seems
(based on simulations for DNA-profiles with six or seven loci and frequencies
between 10−10 and 10−7) reasonable to use a standard deviation p/3 ≤ σ ≤
2p/3 in the below examples.
We will in each example freely use the notation introduced in the section
that it illustrates.
7.1 Classical island problem with uncertain Γ-frequency
We start with the simple version of a homogeneous population X of size
N + 1 and profile frequency p. As we have seen (cf. (5.20) and (5.21)), the
posterior probability of guilt is equal to Ps(G | I, E) = 1/(1+N(p+σ
2/p)) =
1/(1 + Np′). With p/3 ≤ σ ≤ p, we get p′ ∈ [9p/8, 13p/9]. Thus, the effect
of the uncertainty about p is to effectively increase p, or equivalently, to
decrease the likelihood ratio associated to I, E or to E. It may be prudent
to use σ = p. For example, with N = 107, p = 10−8, σ = p, we have
Ps(G | I, E) = 0.83 instead of 0.91.
7.2 Subpopulations and likelihood ratios
We now illustrate the results of Section 4. Suppose that a crime has been
committed in a heterogeneous population X = X1 ∪X2, with N1 = 10
7 and
N2 = 10
5. Prior to DNA-analysis it is estimated that the crime could equally
probably have been committed by a member of X1 as by a member of X2,
i.e., β1 = β2 = 0.5. Now a DNA-trace of the criminal is found, giving rise to
a profile Γ. The forensic lab calculates p1 = 10
−9 and p2 = 10
−8.
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7.2.1 Unconditioned on the profile
The likelihood ratio (4.9) (taking both the fact that the criminal and the
suspect have Γ as evidence) equals 1/(p1β1+p2β2) = 1.8×10
8. This likelihood
ratio holds for any suspect s, as long as S is independent of C.
With this likelihood ratio we obtain, for s ∈ X1, posterior odds in favour
of guilt equal to
(p1β1 + p2β2)
−1β1/N1 ≈ 9,
corresponding to (cf. (4.6)) Ps(G | I, E) = 0.9. For s ∈ X2 the posterior
odds are
(p1β1 + p2β2)
−1β2/N2 ≈ 910,
such that Ps(G | I, E) = 0.999.
7.2.2 Conditional on the profile
Given the fact that C has Γ and the frequencies p1, p2, we can also first cal-
culate P (C ∈ Xi | I) = αi. This gives α1 = 0.09 and α2 = 0.91: since the
profile Γ is rarer in X1, it is much more likely that the criminal is from X2.
The odds on C belonging to X1 are α1/α2 = 10. If this is taken as infor-
mation relative to which everything else is conditioned, then the likelihood
ratio associated to having Γ, is the inverse random match probability for the
suspect: 1/p1 or 1/p2. This gives rise to the same Ps(G | I, E): if s ∈ X1
then the posterior odds are
p−11 α1/(N1− α1) ≈ α1/(N1p1) = 0.09/(10
−9107) = 9,
as above. Similarly, for s ∈ X2, we get posterior odds
p−12 α2/(N2− α2) ≈ α1/(N2p2) = 0.91/(10
−8105) = 910,
as above.
7.2.3 Consequences of errors
When statements are made regarding the subpopulation to which C belongs,
one has to be careful to note whether or not I has been taken into account.
Indeed taking αi equal to βi, that is, α1 = α2 = 0.5, we overestimate posterior
odds in favour of guilt with a factor 10 for suspects from X1 and underes-
timate them with the same factor for suspects from X2. This is a serious
overestimate of the actual odds for suspects from X1. In this example, it
leads to a posterior probability of guilt of 0.98 (instead of 0.90).
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Finally, we note that if that the forensic lab assumes p2 = p1 = 10
−9 for
both populations, e.g. because it always uses the population frequencies of
the dominant population X1, then we arrive at αi = βi. The posterior odds
in favour of guilt will in that case be calculated to be p−11 αi/(Ni − αi) ≈
αi/(p1Ni) for s ∈ Xi. In this example, these odds are 50 for s ∈ X1 and 5000
for s ∈ X2 which is an overestimate in both cases.
7.3 Subpopulations: general case
We next illustrate the results that we have obtained for the case where the
populations is heterogeneous w.r.t. Γ-probability, and there is uncertainty
about the profile frequency in each population, as well as uncertainty about
the subpopulation to which an individual belongs. This is described in section
5.3. Since there are many parameters that can be varied, we will keep some
of them fixed throughout. We assume that the population consists of three
disjoint subpopulations X1, X2, X3, where X1 is the dominant one, and the
others are much smaller. We set N1 = 20 · 10
6, N2 = 10
6, N3 = 10
5 and
σ = p/2. We will compare the true posterior probability of guilt P (G | I, E)
with the probability obtained assuming that for X2, X3 the same Γ-frequency
p1 is used as for X1. This allows one to judge what the consequences are of
having a subpopulation without knowing so. For example, there may be a
region of the country with a relatively high Γ-frequency due to its relative
isolation in the past. In practice it can be difficult to say with certainty if a
given individual belongs to that subpopulation.
We compute for several choices of pi, ǫi and βi the true probability of
guilt and compare it to what one would obtain if p2, p3 would be ignored,
namely (5.20) with N +1 = N1+N2+N3 and p = p1. We denote this result
with P hom(G | I, E) and call it the naive probability of guilt.
Example 7.1. Let p1 = 10
−8, p2 = 10
−7, p3 = 10
−6. We keep the ǫi fixed to a
choice where it is 90% certain that S ∈ X1, not knowing I or E. The results
are summarized in Table 1. Notice that the true probability of guilt may be
Table 1: Guilt probabilities for p1 = 10
−8, p2 = 10
−7, p3 = 10
−6
(ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3) (β1, β2, β3) P (G|I, E) P
hom(G|I, E)
(0.9,0.05,0.05) (0.999,0.0005,0.0005) 0.50 0.79
(0.9,0.05,0.05) uniform 0.70 0.79
(0.9,0.05,0.05) (0.99,0.005,0.005) 0.74 0.79
(0.9,0.05,0.05) (0.9,0.05,0.05) 0.84 0.79
smaller or greater than the naive probability. In the first line with β1 = 0.999,
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there is considerable uncertainty as to the subpopulation to which S belongs
given I, E; in fact Ps(S ∈ X1 | I, E) = 0.40, Ps(S ∈ X3 | I, E) = 0.56.
Since for this choice of parameters Ps(G | I, E, S ∈ X3) (given by (5.23)) is
only 0.32, we get a probability of guilt equal to 0.50, much smaller than the
naive probability. However, as β1 decreases, so does Ps(S ∈ X1 | I, E), and
Ps(S ∈ X3 | I, E) grows. In the last line of Table 1, Ps(S ∈ X3 | I, E) is
large (equal to 0.95), so the posterior probability of guilt is predominantly
given by (5.23) applied to s ∈ X3, which is 0.89 for these parameters.
Example 7.2. As observed above, we obtain the same probabilities P (G |
I, E) (and of course, the same naive probability of guilt), when in the above
example ǫ and β are exchanged. The explanation for these probabilities is
somewhat different. In the first line of Table 1 (now with ǫ1 = 0.999), it is
quite likely that S belongs to X1 given I, E; in fact Ps(S ∈ X1 | I, E) =
0.79, Ps(S ∈ X3 | I, E) = 0.21. Since for this choice of parameters Ps(G |
I, E, S ∈ X1) (given by (5.23)) is only 0.40, we get a probability of guilt
equal to 0.50, much smaller than the naive probability. However, exactly as
for Example 7.1, as ǫ1 decreases, so does Ps(S ∈ X1 | I, E), and Ps(S ∈ X3 |
I, E) grows.
These examples show that the effect of having subpopulations can be
considerable when the profile is more common among the smaller subpopu-
lations, even when both S and C are likely issued from the largest subpopu-
lation. The magnitude and the direction of the subpopulation effect depend
strongly on the a priori probabilities for S and C to belong to each of the
subpopulations.
Example 7.3. Letting S and C be likely issued from X2 or X3, we get a
posterior probability of guilt between 0.80 and 0.85 which does not depend
strongly on the precise choice of ǫi and βi. This is understandable since
these choices all make P (S ∈ X1 | I, E) small, and (5.23) applied to X2 and
X3 yields 0.89 for both populations (note that they have the same expected
number of Γ-bearers).
Example 7.4. Consider the case where p2 and p3 are smaller than p1, for
example p1 = 10
−8, p2 = 10
−9, p3 = 10
−10. The population as a whole then
has a smaller number of expected Γ-bearers compared to when p2 = p3 = p1.
The true probability of guilt exceeds the naive probability unless one is almost
sure that S and C are from different subpopulations, as illustrated in Table
2.
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Table 2: Guilt probabilities for p1 = 10
−8, p2 = 10
−9, p3 = 10
−10
(ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3) (β1, β2, β3) P (G|I, E) P
hom(G|I, E)
uniform uniform 0.80 0.79
(0.9,0.05,0.01) (0.9,0.05,0.05) 0.80 0.79
(0.2,0.6,0.2) (0.2,0.6,0.2) 0.98 0.79
(0.1,0.3,0.6) (0.3,0.3,0.4) 0.97 0.79
(0.9,0.09,0.01) (0.01,0.01,0.98) 0.88 0.79
(0.99,0.009,0.001) (0.001,0.001,0.998) 0.57 0.79
7.4 Γ-correlation: relatedness
Suppose that C has DNA-profile Γ with a population frequency of 10−7, i.e.,
px = 10
−7 for all x ∈ X . Now we select s from X , and Γs = 1. Suppose
that X = {s, y1, y2, y3, z1, . . . , zN} and N = 10
6, such that cyi,s = 10
−3
and czi,s = pzi = 10
−7. Here we model a situation in which the suspect
s has three brothers, whose Γ-probability is 10−3 given Γs = 1, and that
the rest of the population is unrelated to s. If the a priori probabilities are
Ps(C = s | I) = 0.4, Ps(C = yi | I) = 0.1, Ps(C = zj | I) = 0.3/10
6 then the
correction factor (3.6) for the Γ-correlation is equal to
0.6
3 · 104 · 0.1 + 106 · 1 · 0.3 · 10−6
=
0.6
0.3 + 3000
≈
1
5000
,
meaning that the likelihood ratio associated to Γs = 1 has been made 5000
times smaller, reducing it from 1/ps = 10
7 to 2000.
For the posterior probability of guilt Ps(G | I, E), this means that it is
reduced from
2
3
107
1 + 2
3
107
≈ 1−
3
2
10−7
that we would obtain without Γ-correlation, to approximately 1-3/4000.
7.5 Biased search
We recast the example given in Section 7.4 in the setting of a biased search,
to demonstrate the equivalence noted in Section 3.3. As in 7.4, px = 10
−7
for all x ∈ X , we suppose that S = s has been selected and that Γs = 1,and
that there are y1, y2, y3 ∈ X such that σx,yi = 10
4σx,x for i = 1, 2, 3 and
σx,zi = σx,x for all i. The prior odds are as in Section 7.4. Then the likelihood
ratio associated to the evidence Γs = 1 is reduced by a factor of about 5000,
as in Example 7.4. In that example, the value was decreased since finding Γ
in s made it more probable that population members y1, y2, y3, which have
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non-negligible prior probabilities of guilt, also have Γ. In this situation, it is
due to the fact that the selection procedure is such that if s is selected, it
becomes less likely that s is guilty:
P (C = s | S = s, I) =
P (C = s | I)∑
y∈X
σs,y
σs,s
P (C = y | I)
≈
1
7500
,
which is considerably less than 0.4. The fact that s has Γ then raises the
probability of guilt to approximately 1− 3/4000 as above.
7.6 Database effectiveness
In (6.6) we have computed the odds in favour of a unique database match
being with the true criminal. If the database is a random sample of the
population in the sense that P (C ∈ D | I) = |D|/|X| = n/N , then this
equation reads
P (S = C | E1, I)
P (S 6= C | E1, I)
=
1
p(N − n)
,
which is monotonically increasing in n, going from 1/((N − 1)p) for n = 1 to
infinity for n = N . It is not hard to derive this directly: since n− 1 persons
have been shown not to possess Γ, the population that can not be excluded
has size N − n + 1. In that population, only the Γ-status of one individual
(the one that matched in D) is known. Since D was a random sample as
defined above, the classical solution (2.4) applies.
If the database is not a random sample from the population in the above
sense, then the situation is more interesting and quite different.
Example 7.5. Let p = 10−7 and suppose that with n = 105 one has P (C ∈
D | I) = 0.2. For example, this may be because the database consists of
previously convicted individuals and based on the probability of a rightful
conviction and of recidivism one arrives at such an estimate. For database
D, the odds that a unique match is with C are 25 to one, or equivalently,
P (S = C | I, E1) = 0.96.
It may be possible to enlarge D to D′ with |D′| = n′ such that P (S = C |
I, E1) = 0.5, but only at the cost of adding very many individuals into D
′,
e.g. with n′ = 2 · 106. In that case, the odds (6.6) on a unique match being
with the offender decrease to 5, i.e., one in six of such matches will be with
an innocent person.
The probability of actually obtaining a unique match is given by
P (E1) = P (C ∈ D | I)(1− p)
n + P (C /∈ D | I)np(1− p)n−1.
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For database D, this evaluates to 0.206 and for database D′ to 0.491%.
Thus, in D′ a search with a DNA-profile with population frequency 10−7 will
yield a unique match about half of the time, but only 5 out of 6 of these will
be with the true offender. About 10% of such searches will result in two or
more hits, and about 40% will not result in any hit.
When multiple matches are found, it is more likely that one of them is
with the true offender but not a near certainty: e.g., in case two matches
are found (which happens with probability 0.09), about one in ten of such
double matches are both coincidental.
For the original database D, about 20,6% of searches result in a unique
match, almost all of which are with the offender; in the remaining cases one
almost always has no hits: the probability of having more than one match
being 0.002.
Example 7.6. Suppose that the database is set up and expanded such that if
it has size n then P (C ∈ D) =
√
n/N . This is a model for a database in which
individuals with higher prior probability of guilt are put in the database with
higher probability. For example, if D contains the DNA-profiles of 10% of
the population, then it contains C with probability 0.31. If D is enlarged to
contain 30% of the population, then it contains C with probability 0.55.
In that case, the odds on a unique match being with the criminal in a
database of size n are minimal for n = N/4. An example for N = 2 · 107, p =
10−8 is given in Figure 1. With n = N/4 the odds in favour of a unique
match being with the true offender are 20. As the plots show, when the
database is relatively small the odds on a match being with the true offender
decrease rapidly, e.g. from 105 if n = 50.000 to 55 if n = 200.000. As n
grows further, the odds decrease (slowly) to 20 for n = 5 · 106 = N/4. When
n grows further, the odds increase again. When 50% of the population is
included (n = 107), they are 24.
Thus, enlarging a database may at the same time increase the chance of
obtaining a unique match from it, and diminish the value of such a match
in the sense that the probability of it being with the true offender decreases.
These examples suggest that the idea that the larger the database, the better,
needs to be put into perspective. It is of course true that enlarging a database
increases the probability that the criminal is included. It is also obvious
that given a unique match in the database, the probability that it is with
the criminal increases when the database is expanded and does not yield
additional matches. But as we have seen, it does not follow that hits in larger
databases are stronger evidence for guilt than hits in smaller databases.
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Figure 1: Database effectiveness with p = 10−8, N = 2 · 107, P (C ∈ D) =√
n/N
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